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Abstract
This paper reports on efforts being sponsored by the U.S. NRC and performed
by INEEL to develop a technical basis and perform work to extract
information from sources for use in HRA.  This work currently emphasizes
extracting information from operational events.  An anticipated benefit from
this research is that it may provide the methodological tools needed to make
greater use of more types of information in future HRAs and reduce
uncertainties in the information used to conduct human reliability
assessments.
Uncertainty in Human Reliability Analysis
The basic event probabilities in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) associated with
failed human actions are often the product of a specific human reliability analysis
(HRA) method.  HRA methods provide a systematic process for estimating the
likelihood of human failures for different human actions.  Most HRA methods either
allow or direct the analyst to account for the impact of prevailing conditions on the
performance of personnel modeled in the analysis.  These conditions are variously
named by HRA methods.  In some cases, this may reflect important theoretical
distinctions underlying the explanation and prediction of human performance
espoused by a particular method; in other cases this may simply reflect minor
distinctions in terminology.  For example, Swain and Guttman [1] noted these
influences as performance shaping factors – a concept several HRA methods have
adopted.  Recently developed methods have expanded upon this concept and
emphasize greater use of information about context and performance conditions in
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analyses[2,3].
A challenge for human reliability continues to be identifying important contextual
factors for inclusion in human reliability analyses and accounting for their influence.
There are differences in the specific factors employed by different HRA methods for
adjusting the nominal values of error rates.  Considerable analyst judgment is
required to identify factors that may affect the reliability of a candidate human
activity and to estimate their effects on the conditional expectation of success or
failure.  Variability in the estimated magnitude of effect of these factors contributes to
the uncertainty of the resultant risk metric and may contribute to systematic bias in
the perceived importance of these factors on performance reliability.  As a
consequence of differences in analyst approaches to employing and assessing such
factors, estimated failures may have a tendency to become conservative or optimistic
in their treatment of human performance.  This reflects systematic trends in analyst
judgment using HRA methods when accounting for the effects of the elements of
context that affect human performance.
The following illustrates how uncertainty regarding contextual factors may affect
distributions of human performance reliability estimates.  Figure 1 summarizes the
conditional human error probabilities estimated using the SPAR-H HRA method[4].
This distribution was obtained by assuming that the ratings of most PSFs would
follow a normal distribution and simulating 1,000,000 observations using Monte
Carlo simulation. The nominal or expected value of the PSF occurred in most
calculations; other values of the PSFs, either more or less favorable, occurred less
frequently following an expectation function following that of a normally distributed
random variable. The resultant distribution reflecting the product of a set of normally
distributed random variables will tend toward a lognormal distribution. That is:
The distribution of X (the distribution of the SPAR-H HEP estimates) will have the
characteristic lognormal distribution parameters: 
 and
, the first two moments of the lognormal distribution.
The cumulative percentage in Figure 1 shows that approximately 20% of the
distribution lies below 0.01; 60% between 0.01 and 0.1; and 20% of the distribution
lies above 0.1 in the range.  The base HEPs for the SPAR-H elements of diagnosis
and action are 0.001 and 0.01 respectively.  The distribution shows the influence of
the PSFs on the nominal HEPs without any systematic bias in the underlying
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judgments. Furthermore, this distribution might be considered conservative with
respect to its expected values, owing in large part to the influence and uncertainty
assumed in the PSF ratings.  We can observe that improvements in knowledge about
PSFs would serve to reduce the uncertainty in the distribution and may serve to
attenuate some of the peak values in favor of a more lognormally distributed variable.
This phenomenon affects many HRA methods currently employed; the SPAR-H
method is as sensitive to such uncertainties as are other methods.  It was chosen to
illustrate these effects because it is similar to many HRA approaches in its treatment
of shaping factors in quantification.
Approach
The objectives of this work are to:  1) develop a method for conducting risk-informed
event analysis of human performance information that stems from operating
experience at nuclear power plants and for compiling and documenting the results in
a structured manner; 2) provide information from these analyses for use in
risk-informed and performance-based regulatory activities; 3) create methods for
information extraction and a repository for this information that, likewise, support a
variety of HRA methods.
We reviewed a number of contemporary HRA methods including ASEP, ATHEANA,
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CODA, CAHR, CREAM, HEART, MERMOS, and SPAR-H.  The reviews were
performed to identify the kinds of information that analysts may need to apply these
methods.  Related international efforts [5] were also reviewed to assist in identifying
a set of recommended information categories and a structure for reporting information
and to allow for the eventual incorporation of a broader set of information sources.
The internal structure of the resulting repository, termed HERA, is intended to meet
the requirements of most common first- and second-generation HRA methods.  The
internal structure of HERA may not reflect the needs of any single HRA method; its
information support a variety of methods that may be obtained through structured
search or through the development of user-oriented interfaces that are tailored to suit
a specific method or application.
Results
HERA has nine indices for information:  Profile; Event time line; Diagnosis and
Planning; Action; Plant complexity factors; Latent and maintenance complexity
factors; Dependency; Human Action or success table;  and Error type.  These are
described below.
The profile contains the plant name, plant type, event type, human action context,
plant operating mode, failure type, and event summary.  The profile also links to a
graphic representation of the event time line.  The profile provides a summary or
synopsis of the operating experience including the specific human and system related
actions and resulting context in which performance occurred.
The Event time line provides a text summary of the sequential human failure and
success sub-events that occurred in the event.  The event time line provides a
time-based event progression that includes latent or pre-initiator conditions, initiating
events, and post-initiator actions and activities. The graphic time line contains the sub
events most critical to the progression and termination of the event.  It distinguishes
between unsafe acts and human actions where such information can be derived from
event reports.
Diagnosis, Planning or Action sources contain information about performance
shaping factors that were deemed present in the operating event.  Human actions are
classified according to whether they were primarily cognitive or behavioral in nature
– based in diagnosis, planning or the execution of an activity.  Seven performance
shaping factors have been used to characterize contextual factors’ influence on
performance.  These include:  time available; stress; complexity; experience and
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training; procedures; fitness for duty; and work processes.  The diagnosis and
planning source is considered as a separate source from Action as they are typically
exclusive.  That is, a human action is coded as one or the other unless it is sufficiently
ambiguous and the specific human error cannot be ascertained.
Plant Complexity Factors include information regarding the manifestation of the
failures in plant systems and the demands placed upon plant personnel by the
initiating and other related events.  Plant complexity factors were derived primarily
through research by the OECD Halden Reactor Project on factors influencing control
room operator performance.  They are used in HERA as an index of plant conditions.
Latent and Maintenance complexity factors provide information about plant and other
conditions that affect the performance of non-operations work groups in the plant.
This includes some factors that are similar to those associated with operations such as
written procedures, training and qualifications, and human machine interfaces.  It also
includes some factors that are key to effective performance of maintenance, test, and
surveillance activities such as work planning and preparation, skill of crafts, design
configuration, equipment specification, and construction.
Dependency is used to describe when information points to relationships between sub
events in the analysis.  Failures or successes of individual activities may create a
greater likelihood for failure or success of succeeding actions.  Where it is possible to
infer such relationships, HERA contains descriptions of the nature of the dependency
between sub events.
Every event described in LERs and other sources has been terminated successfully
through human intervention in many cases. The human actions success table
documents the actions that were taken by plant personnel to mitigate the progression
of the event.  Successful human actions are an important feature of events and may be
overlooked in studies of human failure.  Together with human failure events,
successful human actions provide a complete description of human performance in
operating events.
Error type information in HERA provides a rough classification of the nature of the
human failure sub event.  The classification follows a taxonomy of slip, lapse,
mistake, or violation.
During 2003, fourteen events were analyzed following a process that employs
multi-disciplinary review of operating events to derive the information described
above.  Events were selected during the first year’s effort that involve failure,
detection, and restoration of emergency diesel generator systems.  The aim of the
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reviews was to begin with analyses involving failure of similar, risk-relevant plant
systems, and to consider development of methods for using this information to inform
activities that could employ such information.  The use of Bayesian techniques, for
example, is under consideration to make use of information in HERA.  Seventy-four
individual human failure and success sub events were identified and analyzed by this
process and entered into HERA.
Future Direction
Following the completion of these initial information extraction activities, a
workshop was held to review the results of activities.  Workshop attendees included
NRC staff and contractor personnel involved or familiar with this project including
potential users of HERA.  Workshop attendees identified a number of near term and
longer term goals for the system, including enhancements to data quality and
quantity, tailoring and restructuring of information categories, user capabilities for
searching and analysis using HERA, and aligning development with ongoing NRC
projects and activities to enhance system use and development.
The focus of the current work has been on creation and usability of the back-end or
data entry portion of HERA although the eventual goal is to enable user-initiated
search and summary functions to support regulatory applications.  Efforts to guide
extraction and data entry are necessary and affect the kinds and quality of future
user-system interaction.  The aim of extracting information from operating experience
has been to enable use of this information in future human reliability analyses.  These
information extraction activities have emphasized providing information on a range
of information categories broadly useful to the most common first- and
second-generation HRA methods.  The eventual goal of these efforts is to improve the
means by which the range of effects that performance shaping factors and other
elements of context are accounted for in reliability analyses.  Together with new
methods and enhancements to existing methods, such information may be used to
reduce the uncertainty in human reliability analyses, and improve our ability to make
predictions of risk.
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